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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY ~IOUNTAIN HONEY COM-
PANY, Inc., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
~!ARION R. CRYSTAL and DELSA 
N. CRYSTAL, his· wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 7243 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This action was brought by the plaintiff and appel-
lant in the Third Judicial District Court at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and involves a house and lot located at 
645 North Second West in Salt Lake City. Although 
the complaint has six causes of action, the principal 
prayer is twofold: one, claim for the entire piece of 
property 3¥2 rods x 10 rods, alleged to have been ac-
quired hy reason of a tax sale to Salt Lake City Cor-
poration and a deed from Salt Lake City Corporation 
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to the appellant; and two, appellant prays that it be 
given an easement along the south boundary of the 
property in question. There were also claims for dam-
ages to personal property, actual and punitive, and a 
restraining order was sought. At the conclusion of ap-
pellant's case, respondents moved to dismiss all causes 
of action on the ground~ among others that there was 
a total lack of proof. This motion was granted as to the 
first cause of action, which sought title by virtue of an 
alleged special tax deed from Salt Lake City Corpora-
tion. Thereafter, respondents ,presented their case as 
to the remaining causes of action, and at the conclusion 
thereof, the court made Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law, and entered a judgment in favor of re-
spondents accordingly on all remaining causes of action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(All italics, unless otherwise n.oted, are respondents') 
The statement of facts set forth in appellants' brief, 
if in reality there is any such statement, is so brief it is 
deemed advisable to amplify same. 
The property involved in this action, including the 
alleged easement across it, lies wholly within Lot 8 of 
block 138, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey. Block 138 
contains 8 lots and lies between 5th and 6th North and 
2nd and 3rd West Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Pugsley Street intersects this block through the middle 
in a north-south direction, and lots 2 and 7 abut this 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
avenue on the East, lots 3 and 6 on the \Yest. Lot 8 lies 
to the east of lot 7, and abuts along 2nd West Street . 
..... -\.ppellant 's exhibit T not scaled, is a very rough 
drR\Ying of the property herein directly involved, as 
\Yell as of adjacent property to the south and west. 
Appellant's exhibit S and repondents' exhibit 2 are 
abstracts of title covering these properties which con-
tain a more accurate plat, so far as legal descriptions 
are concerned, at the back of each abstract. 
The house and lot of respondents, at 645 North 
Second ·west Street, faces easterly on the west side of 
2nd West with a frontage of 57.75 feet, and the lot ex-
tends east and west for the entire width of Lot 8, Block 
138, or a distance of 165 feet. Immediately to the south 
of this area lies a house and lot belonging to appellant 
of about the same frontage, and also extending east and 
west the full width of Lot 8. T·o the west of both of these 
areas lies another tract of ground to which appellant 
claims title, whose north and south measurements equals 
the combined frontage measurement of the first two 
tracts mentioned, and which extends east and west the 
full vvidth of Lot 7, Block 138, or a distance of 165 feet 
eastward from Pugsley Street. 
A driveway extends westerly from 2nd West Street 
along the south side of respondents' house, and immed-
iately adjacent to the south line of res.pondents' property 
for a distance of about one-half the lot depth, where it 
turns to the north and around the rear of the house, 
entering a garage. The claimed easement covers not 
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only this east-west portion of the driveway, but also an 
of it extension to the west clear to the extreme west edge 
of the respondents' property. Immediately parallel to 
this driveway and to the south lies another driveway 
serving the house and lot to the south, which extends 
from 2nd West in a westerly direction to a warehouse, 
the northeast corner of which is three or four inches 
and the northwest corner of which is about nine inches 
south of the dividing line between the two properties. 
See appellant's exhibit BB, a certificate of survey pre-
pared at the request of the respondents, and R. 219. 
A so-called ditch slopes slightly to the west along the 
full north side of this warehouse or shed, and lies wholly 
upon the property of the south lot, which is not involved 
in this action, in this extremely narrow strip. Immedi-
ately to the west of this warehouse, which is referred to 
in the testimony as No. 1, and which was constructed 
about 1917 (R. 196), lies an additional warehouse, the 
north line of which is an extension of the north line of 
"\varehouse No. 1 and which was in turn constructed 
about 1937 (R. 210). This second warehouse lies wholly 
within the property to the west of respondents' house, 
which abutts on Pugsley Street and is within the limits 
of Lot 7, Block 138. 
By Uniform Real Estate Contract dated and re-
corded rOctoher 24, 1941, the Campbell Commercial Com-
pany sold the respondents thei11 house and lot, described 
as follows: 
Beginning 2% rods North from the South-
east corner of Lot 8, Block 138, Plat "A", Salt 
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Lake City Survey, and running thence North 31f2 
rods; thence \"\rest 10 rods; thence South 3¥2 rods; 
thence East 10 rods to the place of beginning. 
Thereafter, by '''arranty deed dated and recorded 
March 23, 1944, the Campbell Commercial Campany 
granted title to respondents to this property, which com-
pany had derived its title through grants running to 
the original patent (See abstract, exhibit 2). On Sep-
tember 3, 1946, Salt Lake City executed a quitclaim 
deed or disclaimer to Otto S. Grow, of such title as was 
acquired by special assessment levied in connection w~th 
Sewer Extension No. 437, (Exhibit G), who later quit-
claimed to appellant, On October 3, 1946, the Utah Oil 
Company quitclaimed a right-of-way to Appellant ''along 
the south line" of respondents' property (Exhibit H). 
There are a number of exhibits and some testimony 
relative to the levy, assessment and sale relative to 
Sewer Extension No. 437 made by Salt Lake City, but in 
the interest of logic and convenience of the court the de-
tails of these matters can be more adequately vresented, 
it is believed, in connection with the argument relative 
to such interest as app·ellant claims Salt Lake City 
acquired through the sewer assessment and sale. 
There is dispute in the testimony, to a limited extent, 
as to whether or not the west line of the respondents' 
property was so fenced or choked with debris as to 
preclude the passage of vehicles along the so called right-
of-way lying on the extreme southerly portion of the 
;property. Mr. William F. Weiler, property manager of 
Zion's Benefit Building Society, stated that between 
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the years 1933 and 1936 he visited res;pondents' prop-
erty about once a month in connection with his duties 
(R. 270), and during such visit he noted the condition 
of all of these premises in connection with his duties 
at the time. The driveway extended from Second West 
Street west to a point about 40 feet east of the west prop-
erty line, and then turned north around the house. (R. 272), 
and the entire west side of the property, including the 
southerly :portion, was so overgrown with weeds and 
choked with debris, and was ·also fenced, that it would 
n9t have been possible to drive a car through this area 
(R. 273). Elva Turville actually resided in these prem-
ises from 1933 to 1935 (R. 295), and stated that the 
entire west end of the lot was blocked up with a ''tumbled 
down old fence made of old boards and wagon wheels and 
ties'' ( R. 296). She also s~ated that during this period 
it was impossible to drive a car through the west portion 
of the lot (R. 298). Roland Turville, her son, also .testi-
fied to the same condition (R. 306, 307). Mr. Harry C. 
Grider lived in the :premises during 1939 or 1940 for a 
period of about 9 months (R. 309), and testified that a 
fence of sorts extended the entire length of the west 
property line when he lived there (R. 310). Mr. Walter 
L. Keil lived in the home immediately to the north of 
the premises from 1932 to 1946 (R. 313), and from the 
rear of his house had a clear view of the west end of the 
respondents ' property ( R. 313). He testified that during 
this period the en tire west line of the respondents' prop-
erty was barricaded and obstructed by railroad ties and 
berry bushes, with no opening, although a child could 
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cra,vl oyer it (R. 314, 315), and that a car could not pass 
(R. 316). Thiabel L. Keil, "~ife of Walter L. Keil, testi-
fied to the same condition during the early years of their 
residence, (R. 327). Delsa Crystal, one of the respon-
dents~ n1oved into the :premises "ith her husband in 1941, 
at "'"hich time there 'vas an opening or gate in the south 
end of the fence, along the west line large enough for a 
car to go through (R. 349), which was closed by. respon-
dents in 1942 to prevent any vehicles from going west-
ward to the property lying to the west of this fence 
(R. 349). 
We should point out that there is some conflict 
in the testimony after the year 1936 as to the con-
dition of the west line, when the additional warehouse 
was constructed to the west on -the property in lot 7. It 
is also interesting to note that in 1916 one Cyrus Neal 
owned the property of both appellant and respondents 
fronting on 2nd West Street, and in granting the south-
erly tract now belonging to appellant, he also granted 
a right of way over the south four feet of respondents' 
property, apparently the intention being to create a 
joint driveway between the two places. The plan did 
not materialize, and this four foot easement was re-
turned by grant in 1919. (R. 205, 206), and abstract, 
exhibit 2. Again, according to the testimony of Serge 
B. Campbell, president of the Campbell Commercial 
Company, which was the predecessor in interest of the 
present respondents, Otto Grow of the appellant company 
offered to purchase a right-of-way along the south line 
of the property here involved in 1939 for the sum of $400 
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(R. 204), which was apparently to be used for purposes 
of driving trucks from Second West Street through and 
to appellants' warehouse to the rear of both appellant's 
and respondents' :properties. Respondent refused such 
offer because of the obvious fact that they were attemp-
ting to improve the property surrounding their house (R. 
373), and did not care to have their property spoiled by 
the passage of large trucks and other commercial vehicles. 
Otto Grow of appellant company stated that certain 
injury was done to packing boxes and supplies located 
in the warehouse by virtue of the fact that a drainage 
ditch along the north edge of warehouse No. 1 became 
clogged and he was refused permission to go upon the 
respondents' property to clean the same, with the result 
that rain water accumulated and flowed into the ware-
house in 1945. He testified that in 1917, the ditch was 
constructed four inches wide and one foot deep at the 
east end, and 'videned to ·nine inches at the west end of 
warehouse No. 1. Witness Weiler, (R, 273) could not re-
call even the existence of any ditch in this area between 
1933 and 1936; witness Campbell could only recall a 
little depression in 1939 (R. 286); witness Elva Turville 
between 1933 and 1935 could not recall any ditch at all 
(R. 300); nor could witness Grider in 1939 and- 1940 
(R. 312); nor could witness Keil (R. 322). The damage 
occured, moreover, at the time of a heavy storm through-
out Salt Lake city in 1945, which washed out a portion 
of the city cemetery (R, 220). Mrs. Keil stated her recol-
lection of the storm as one of water in the area like a 
mill race, flooding basements, drowning chickens, and 
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depositing debris of mud, silt and ""eeds over the lawns 
of the property in the area (R. 327, 328), and Mr. Kiel 
testified in the same Yein, placing the mud depth of de-
posit at four or five inches. (R. 321). Respondent Crys-
tal testified to the same thing, and also stated that the 
depression or ditch would haYe been inadequate to carry 
off the flood \Yaters in any event, whether perfectly 
cleaned or not (R. 357). In addition, the dividing line 
between the lots abutting on 2nd West was separated 
by a cement coping, eight inches high on the south side, 
and twelve inches high on the north side, which extended 
·eastward from the east side of warehouse No. 1. All the 
property of the area slopes wetward, and the flood en-
tered at the east end of the warehouse (R. 220). More-
over, there was a wooden fence along the south property 
line and immediately north of the so-called ditch until 
1937, when it was torn down (R. 218). 
In 1937, Otto Grow had caused gravel to be placed 
along a part of the driveway with the full consent of the 
then owner of the property (R. 165). After 1942, respon-
dent Marion Crystal removed cinders and big rocks, but 
not gravel, from the southwest corner area of: the prem-
ises in connection with ·some landscaping he was doing 
(R. 373), all of which material removed totalled about a 
yard, or yard and one-half. Witness Campbell testified 
that he cleaned up the area in 1939, and there was no 
gravel of any kind in the area from which appellant 
claims it was allegedly moved (R. 289). 
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ARGUMENT 
It is difficult to discern any correlation between the 
assignments of error, argument, and what apparently 
is a list of points argued in appellant's brief. In view of 
this, there seems no other logical way to present argu-
ment in respondents' brief except through an analysis 
of each separate cause of action. Appellant also com-
plains as to the findings made by the court, but we cannot 
determine from the brief the specific ~·oints of complaint 
in this regard, and since the findings are clearly sup-
ported by the evidence, and with equal clarity support 
the judgment, we can perceive no reason for analysis of 
each and every finding, and the consumption of the 
court's time in this regard, when in reality there may 
,be no disagreement at all. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
A. There is no proof that notice of intention was 
ever given of the assessment of a special tax upon the 
property here involved. 
As was pointed out in the statement of facts, the 
sole claim of appellant to the title of the entire tract of 
property owned by reS:pondents arises by virtue of a 
quitclaim or disclaimer from Salt Lake City Corporation, 
affecting such interest as it in turn had a.cquired by vir-
tue of sewer extension No. 437 and proceedings there-
under. 
It was stipulated between counsel during the trial 
of the action that the applicable ordinances of Salt Lake 
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City should be deemed in evidence for the purpose of 
trial. Generally, the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, 1920, "'"ere in effect during the years 1925 and 1926, 
the period of initiation of the special tax proceedings 
herein. On ~Iay 30, 1921, that portion of the Revision of 
1920 dealing with special taxes was amended and revised, 
and continued in effect until a later ReYision of the Salt 
Lake City ordinances in 1934. Hereafter, references in 
this brief to Salt Lake City ordinances will refer to the 
amendment of 1921, \vhich is almost the same as the 
ordinances affecting this subject found in the 1934 Re-
vision, although there are some differences. 
Section 1735 of the Salt Lake City ordinances, as 
amended in 1921, provides for the notice of intention to 
make the special im:p-rovement. Proper notice is jur-
isdictional, and unless it is given the entire assessment 
and any proceedings taken thereunder are invalid, and 
may be collaterally attacked: Jones VB. Foulger, 46 
Utah 419, 150 pac. 933; Branting vs. Salt Lake City, 47 
Utah 296, 153 Pac. 995. Property may not be taken for 
a special assessment unless and until the owner of the 
property is given notice and opportunity to be heard 
before a competent and impartial tribunal. Elkins VB. 
Millard ~Cownty Drainage District, 77 Utah 303, 294 Pac. 
307. 
The last paragraph of section 1735 provides as 
follows: 
"Within five days after the first publication 
of such notice the city engineer shall furnish the 
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city recorder and city treasurer a list of the 
owners of the property within the district affected 
by such improvement, and the recorder shall 
within five days thereafter, mail post ~aid to 
each of said property owners a copy of said notice 
addressed to the last known residence of such 
property owner. The city engineer, shall, when 
directed so to do by the board of commissioners, 
prepare plans and specifications for said im-
provements.'' 
There is. no evidence in this record of any compliance 
with this portion of the ordinance. In an attempt, ap-
.parently, to prove such compliance, appellant introduced 
exhibit Y, which purports to be a copy of the notice and 
which is a printed document at the hottom of which ap-
pears the notation, "Notice mailed July 7, 1925. H .. T." 
This is certainly no proof of any kind, and there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that the property owners 
affected ever received any notice at all. 
Moreover, an examination of the notice, see ex-
hibits Y and D, shows that the owners of property abut-
ting on Second West were not in any way notified that 
their property might be affected by any levy. This 
notice states that there shall be a half rate applied on 
both sides of Pugsley Street from 5th to 6th North 
Streets, within this district, and no mention whatever 
is made of Second West Street. It is apparent that there 
was no possible benefit from a sewer on Pugsley ·Street 
to property abutting on Second West. 
Thus, in Jones vs. Foulge:r, 46 Utah 419, 150 Pac. 
933; the court states at page 425: 
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''Again, even in the general description, tl~e 
property in the notice is limited to such n~ IS 
'abutting thereon,' that is abutting on Hudson 
aYenue, the street which was to be opened. By 
referring to the plat it 'Yill be seen that plain-
tiffs' property did not actually abut, that is, ad-
join the ,proposed street. We need not pause 
now, however, to determine 'vhat property is 
·bounding, abutting or adjacent' on or to a con-
templated improvement within the purview of our 
statute. It is sufficient no"\v to determine that 
the description contained in the notice of inten-
tion clearly and manifestly did not include the 
property of the plaintiffs as abutting property. 
That was also the view of the board of equaliza-
tion, and likewise of the city council when the 
original ordinance was adopted. Had the city 
council thought that the property of the plain-
tiffs was included in the notice of intention, it 
would have levied the special tax thereon in the 
original ordinance, and no 'amended' ordinance 
would have been necessary. We thus have a 
clear case ,, ... here by a general statement some-
thing may be deemed to be included which by a 
particular statement is, however, clearly and man-
ifestly excluded. This case, therefore, must be 
regarded as though no notice of intention had 
been published in so far as the plaintiffs are 
concerned. If, therefore, the publishing of notice 
of intention is jurisdictional, the city council 
never obtained jurisdiction to levy the special 
tax upon the property of the plaintiffs, and hence 
the tax here in question is void. If the property 
of the plaintiffs could be legally assessed under 
the notice in question, we do not see why the 
board of equalization could not have recom-
mended that any and all property 'adjacent' to 
the improvement should not also be assessed, and 
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the city council could have done so by adopting 
an 'amended ordinance.' To so hold would prac-
tically do away 'vith the publishing of a notice of 
intention as required by our statute." 
It is submitted that no notice of intention was given, 
and that this constitutes a jurisdictional defect render-
ing the entire ;proceedings invalid. 
B. Sewer assessment No. 437 was never intended to 
and did not in any way affect the property here involved. 
It will be recalled from the statement of fact, that 
all of the property with which we are here concerned 
lies within Lot 8 of Block 138. A casual glance at the 
record and e:xhibits clearly shows that the assessment 
for this sewer extension was levied upon Lots 2, 3, 6 
and 7 of Block 138, and had no relation whatsoever to 
property in Lot 8. 
Exhibit A is a copy of the ordinance levying the 
tax, dated September 15, 1925, and clearly shows the 
extent of assessment. This ordinance is required by 
section 17 43 of the ordinances covering special taxes, 
and provides for the levy of tax. Section 17 43 pro-
vides that after certain preliminaries have been com-
plied with: 
'' the board of commissioners shall ;pass an 
ordinance levying a special tax sufficient in 
amount to cover the cost of such improvements, 
as appears by the contract entered into for the 
performance of said work ..... 
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''Said ordinance shall include : 
'' (c) .. A. description of the blocks, lots or parts 
thereof~ or pieces of ground affected or bene-
fited by said improvement, and upon which said 
tax is levied. '' 
The ordinance of exhibit A does describe the lots 
affected in detail, and reads as follows : 
"AN ORDINANCE 
"AN ORDINANCE LEVYING A TAX and for 
the assessment of property in Sewer Districts 
Nos. 1 ·and 2 (Sewer Extension No. 437) for the 
purpose of constructing a sewer. 
''Be it ordained by the Board of Commissioners 
of Salt Lake City, Utah: Section 1. That the 
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City does 
hereby levy the tax and provide for the assessment 
of the same upon the property hereinafter des-
cribed in Sewer Districts Nos. 1 and 2 (Sewer 
Extension No. 437) for the purpose of construct-
ing a sewer, to-wit: 
'' ...... Lots 2, 3, 6 and 7, of Blk. 138, Plat 
A, Salt Lake City Survey; abutting on hoth 
sides of Gale Street from 9th South to Amer-
ican Ave., both sides of American Avenue 
from 2nd West to Gale St., both sides of 
Pugsley Street from 5th to 6th North Streets 
" 
Again it is noted there is no inclusion of any prop-
erty in Lot 8, and the above section contains all of the 
property described in Block 138. The assessment has 
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no more relevancy to Lot 8 than it does to property 
lying along 21st South Street. While assessments of 
this kind are made to the full depth of the lot affected, 
this of course does not and cannot extend that assess-
ment to any other lot. A further consideration of Ex-
hibit A shows that the first and final estimate which is 
made a part of this exhibit, and which shows in detail 
the footage of abutting property, lists only Lots 2, 3, 6 
and 7 of B.lock 138. Another part of this exhibit shows 
the names and addresses of the property owners of the 
area, giving the lot and block of their holdings. Again 
this list shows only property in lots 2, 3, 6 and 7 of 
Block 138. In none of these documents is the slightest 
mention made of Lot 8. The exhibit also contains a 
NOTICE OF SPECIAL TAX which again fails to list 
any p~roperty in Lot 8, although it does cover Lots 2, 
3, 6 and 7 of Block 138. 
Again, the notice to property owners, Exhibit E, 
w·hich initially sets forth that assessment for this sewer 
extension is about to be levied, reads as follows: 
''Notice 
To Property Owners 
Notice is hereby given that the assessment 
of a tax is about to be levied by the Board of 
Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, upon the 
following property ..... Lots 2, 3, 6 and 7, 
Block 138, Plat "A", Salt Lake City Survey, 
for the pur:pose of constrncting sewer, wherein 
assessment is made . . . . Pugsley St., 5th to 6th 
No. ; . . . . . etc. " 
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This clearly shows that all of the reference in this 
notice to any property in Block 138, is to property within 
Lots 2, 3, 6 and 7, and nowhere is Lot 8 mentioned . 
.L\.ppellan t complains of the ruling of the lower court 
on the ground that the same individual owned the prop-
erty here involved and the piece lying to the west of it 
in Lot 7, and states that because of this, the assessment 
for the sewer for the full depth back of the lots involved 
included Lot 8. If the same individual happened to own 
all of the property lying a mile to the east, it would be 
quite as logical to state that the assessment extended that 
distance. It seems completely apparent that the assess-
ment affected only Lot 7, and could not in any way af-
fect Lot 8 which fronted on 2nd West Street and derived 
no benefit whatsoever from this sewer line. Appellant's 
contention is completely without merit. 
C. Any interest acquired by Salt Lake City was lost 
prior to its attempted grant by redemption. 
Another point deserves note in connection with this 
tax sale. Exhibit F is a tax sale redemption certi-
ficate dated May 5, 1943, redeeming the affects of the 
special tax sale for sewer extension No. 437 from the 
certificate of sale, exhibit GG, dated August 2, 1934. 
The quitclaim or disclaimer, however, from Salt Lake 
City to Otto Grow. is dated September 3, 1946, Exhibit 
G. It thus appears that all of the :property had been 
redeemed more than 10 years prior to the execution of 
this instrument from Salt Lake City, and if this is cor-
rect, no interest remained in Salt Lake City to quit-
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claim, since the effect of the redemption was to divest 
the city of any such interest. It is, of course, fundamental 
under Utah law that the individual redeeming acquires 
no title or interest by virtue of such act. 
D. There was a failure to comply with essential pro-
cedural steps relative to the acquisition by .Salt Lake City 
of title to property through tax sale, rend·ering sale invalid. 
While it may be that mere irregularities in some 
procedural steps outlined by our statutes, and ordinances 
· enacted pursuant thereto, relative to special tax sales 
do not invalidate the sale, an examination of the record 
shows complete omission of several essential steps in 
the instant case. The extent and nature of omission 
goes far beyond .anything that might be termed a mere 
irregularity. The absence of the proper jurisdictional 
notice of intention has already been noted, but there 
are other omissions which it is submitted are of an 
equally serious nature. 
Section 1737 of the ordinances provides that before 
any special tax for special improvement shall be levied, 
the board of commissioners shall cause to be J;>ublished 
a notice to contractors calling for bids which shall be 
published for a period of a.t least twenty days in each 
issue of a newspaper published in Salt Lake City. There 
is not a scintilla of evidence in the record that any such 
notice was ever given. 
Section 1741 of the ordinances p-rovides that the 
Board ·of Equalization after hearings on the proposed 
levy, shall report to the ·city commission any changes 
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or corrections made by it in the assessment list, and upon 
such report being made, the board of commissioners 
shall proceed "'"ith the leYy of such tax. There is nothing 
in the record to show that the corrected assessment list 
was so reported. · 
Section 17 50 provides : 
''Notice of special tax. Immediately upon the 
receipt by the city treasurer of the certified copy 
of the ordinance levying a special tax or assess-
ment, as provided herein, the city treasurer shall 
give at least five day's notice in one or more 
papers having a general circulation in the city, 
of the time when such tax or assessment shall 
become delinquent; such notice shall be substan-
tially in the following form: 
NOTICE OF SPECIAL TAX 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
"Notice is hereby given that a special tax for 
the purpose of (here insert briefly a description 
of the improvement for which the tax is levied) 
has been levied by ordinance of the board of 
commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, which 
became effective on the ________________________________ . 
''Said special tax is levied upon the following 
described real property in Salt Lake City, to 
wit: (Here insert a full description of the prop-
erty affected by the levy, according to lots, blocks 
or parts thereof, or pieces of ground as the sa.me 
may have been platted and recorded), and is due 
and payable in equal annual installments, begin-
ning __________ -----------------------------_. 
"Interest at the rate of . . . (not to exceed 
seven) per cent :per annum on the whole amount 
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of said tax shall be computed from the date the 
ordinance levying said tax becomes effective, to 
wit: the ________________ day of ________________________________ 19 ________ ; 
and interest at said rate on the whole amount 
of said tax unpaid shall be due and payable with 
each installment. ________________ If any installment or the 
interest aforesaid. is not paid on the date when 
the same becomes due, then the whole amount of 
the tax unpaid at the time said installment and 
interest are due will become due and payable, and 
will draw interest at the rate of ten per cent per 
annum until paid. One or more of said install-
ments in the order in which they are payable 
aforesaid, or the whole tax, may be paid at any 
time within fifteen days after the ordinance levy-
ing the tax become effective, without interest; 
·and one or more of said installments in the order 
in which they are payable, or the whole tax un-
paid, may be paid on the day any installment is 
due, by paying the amount thereof and interest 
to said day. If said tax is not paid when due 
I shall proceed at once to collect same with in-
terest and costs, as provided by law and ordinance. 
" 
Exhibit W is apparently the only proof of com-
pliance with this section. It will be noted that there is 
nothing in the exhibit to show that the very purpose of 
the section, namely to enable property owners to deter-
mine when the tax becomes delinquent, had been properly 
presented to interested parties. In net effect, there is 
no proof that this notice was ever given. Moreover, 
the section requires a description of the property by 
lots and blocks, but this apparently was not done. It 
I. 
is true that Exhibit A contains a notice which follows 
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the requirements of the section· above, b~tt there is noth-
ing to show it was. published a.s it appears in Exhibit A. 
As has been previously noted, moreover, this delinquent 
notice in Exhibit A is a notice that taxes are delinquent, 
not on Lot 8, but on lots 2, 3, 6 and 7 of Block 138. 
Section 1751 of the ordinances requires the city 
treasurer to deposit in the mails postpaid and addressed 
to the several owners of the property affected by the 
levy, as they appear on the records of the county as-
sessor, a personal notice, containing the facts relating 
to the assessment and substantially in the form provided 
for the published notice above. Exhibit V is apparently 
the proof of this mailing, but consists of an affidavit 
attached to a blank printed form, and does not in any 
way indicate that a single notice was mailed to any par-
ticular property holder affected by this levy. 
Section 1752 of the ordinances p·rovides : 
"Within ten days after the date of delin-
quency, as fixed in the levy and notice of tax, 
the city treasurer shall proceed to make up a 
list of all property upon which the special tax 
remains due and unpaid, and upon completion 
cause the same to be published in some news-
paper having general circulation in the city,_ daily 
thereafter for a period of ten day~.'' 
" 
As this court stated in Peterson vs. Ogden City, 
176 P. 2d 599, 603, 604: 
''Plaintiff makes two arguments for laches 
or estoppel. The first is that that part of Section 
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20 of the ordinance which says, 'Ten days after 
the date of delinquency as fixed in the levy and 
notice of tax, or thereafter, the City Treasurer 
shall proceed to make up a list of all property 
upon which special taxes remain due and unpaid, 
and upon completion cause the same to be pub-
lished once in some newspaper having general 
circulation in Ogden City,' is mandatory and the 
failure of the treasurer to act within the time 
provided defeats the lien. Technically, this is not 
an argument for 'laches' or 'estoppel' as those 
words are ordinarily used but rather an argu-
ment that the city has failed to comply with a 
mandatory statutory provision and has therefore 
lost its lien. 
''We agree that the treasurer must comply 
with Section 20 in order to make a valid sale of 
the property for special taxes. 
" 
Exhibit B is an affidavit of publication of this de-
linquency notice. It was not published for a period of 
ten days at all, but as appears from the affidavit only 
in one issue of the Deseret News, on July 30, 1934, nor 
can it be determined from the record that even this 
one publication was within 10 days after date of delin-
quency. 
It will be observed that time and again In the 
course of procedural steps there has been a failure to 
give the property owners affected by the levy a notice 
of the status of the levy as required by the ordinances. 
Appellant's brief takes the position that all of these 
omissions are mere irregularities which can· have no 
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ultimate effect on the tax sale. If this were true, then 
the only step required under such reasoning would be 
that of acquiring- a valid notice of intention. We do not 
believe this is the la,v, and believe that these additional 
steps and notices are as essential to continuing juris-
diction as the original notice of intention. 
Ap:p·ellant cites the case of Stott vs. Salt Lake ·City, 
47 Utah 113, 151 Pac. 988 for the proposition that in a 
case of this kind irregularities in the absence of fraud, 
mistake or gross injustice, are not available to one con-
testing a tax deed. In the Stott case, the essential con-
troversy arose over whether or not the sidewalk had 
been constructed in conformity with the type specified 
in the notice of intention, and the evidence showed that 
although there had been some structural change, the 
sidewalk as constructed was equally a.s serviceable as 
that of the notice. The suit, moreover, was not one 
determining the validity of a tax sale, but was an at-
tempt on the part of proJ>erty owners to restrain and 
enjoin the collection of the special levy. Irregularities 
of the type involved in that case are entirely distinct 
from the failure, as in the instant case, to conform to 
the various steps required to effect a valid tax sale. 
Appellant further cites Branting V'S. Salt Lake City, 
47 Utah 296, 153 P_ac. 995, for the same proposition. 
That case was an attempt to annual certain ordinances 
and proceedings in connection with a special tax. The 
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language of the case itself clearly indicates the issues, 
at 1page 298 : 
"While it is not disputed in the complaint 
that the a:ppellan t had complied with all the juris-
dictional steps required by our statute to author-
ize it to order the sewer constructed and to make 
the assessment and to levy the special tax to pay 
therefor, yet it is alleged that the appellant ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction or authority in making 
an assessment and in levying a tax in excess 
of a certain amount as hereinafter stated." 
Again the type of irre~ularity was something -en-
tirely distinct from the complete omission ·of necessary 
procedural steps, which is the question here involved, 
and it submitted that the case is for that reason entirely 
irrelevant. 
Appellant also seems to take the position in its brief, 
page 9, that the burden is upon the respondents to prove 
wherein the tax proceedings are invalid. We believe 
the record clearly shows this failure, but submit that 
under well established Utah law a person who seeks 
to set up a tax title in himself must 1prove that all pro-
cedural steps to perfect that title have been fully com-
plied with. 
Thus in the early case of Eastman vs. Gurry, 15 
Utah 411, 49 Pac. 310, the court stated at page 417: 
''Many of these questions arose and were 
decided in the case of Olsen v. Bagley, 10 Utah 
492. In that case the court held that 'tax sales 
are made exclusively under statutory power, and, 
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unless all the necessary prerequisites of the stat-
ute are carried out, the tax sale become invalid. 
If one of the prerequisites fail, it is as fatal as 
if all failed. The power vested in a public officer 
to sell land for the nonpayment of taxes is a 
naked power, not coupled with an interest, and 
every prerequisite to the exercise of the :power 
must precede its exercise. ·The title to be ac-
quired under statutes authorizing the sale of 
land for the nonpayment of taxes is regarded 
as stricti juris, and whoever sets up a tax title 
must show that all the requirements of the law 
have been complied with.' '' 
See Tinctic Undine Mining Co. vs. Ercanbrack, 93 Utah 
561, 7 4 p. 2d 1184. 
Appellant also complains, brief, page 11, that the 
court erred in not requiring respondents to reimburse 
appellant for the amount of taxes allegedly paid by it. 
The reason the court did not do so is apparent, and as 
was pointed out above, this assessment was never levied 
upon nor intended to cover Lot 8, which derived no 
benefit from said sewer. There was obviously no occa-
sion to reimburse appellant for taxes which never existed 
so far as this property is concerned. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
A. There is a failure of proof to establish an ease-
ment of any kind in behalf of appellant over tbe property 
of respondents. 
The pleadings in regard to the second cause of 
action fail to specify in :any way the basis under which 
appellant claims an easement over respondents' prop-
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erty. While it is believed this is necessary, apparently 
on the trial of the action this cause of action was based· 
upon a quitclaim deed dated October 3, 1946 from the 
Utah Oil Refining Company, Exhibit H. An examina-
tion ·of the deed shows that it does not purport to grant 
a right-of-way over the south ten feet of the property, 
but vaguely ''along the south line''. In any event, the 
record and this exhibit clearly indicates that no interest 
passed by this deed because the Utah Oil Refining Com-
pany never possessed or intended to own such a right 
of way. 
Exhibit 1, introduced by respondent, is an agree-
ment between the then owner of the property and the 
Oil Company dated September 17, 1923. The exhibit 
obviously concerned the use of underground waters. 
Mr. Robert G. Clark, Chief Engineer, Utah Oil Refining 
Company, testified that during the early 1920's the 
company was pumping water from its wells near the re-
finery, with the resultant lowering of the water table 
in adjacent areas. The property here involved was 
within those areas, and the then owner commenced a 
suit against the company seeking damages for this drain 
upon the underground waters. The recitals of the in-
strument itself and the testimony of Mr. Clark (R. 257 
to 259), make this clear. In settlement of that lawsuit, 
and to grant to the Oil Company certain undergrbund 
water rights, exhibit 1 was executed. The language of 
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the granting clause and one additional paragraph (the 
instrument is not herein set out in full) is as follows: 
'' .. A .. nd said g~rantors have granted, sold, con-
veyed and quitclaimed, and by these presents do 
grant, sell, convey and quitclaim to the Utah Oil 
Refining Company, a corporation, grantee, all 
of the right, title and interest of said grantors 
and of each of them in and to all of the artesian, 
percolating and natural subsurface waters, ap-
purtenant to, belonging to, or underlying and 
contained in the so called Artesian Basin, and 
other artesian basins, as same under lies Blocks 
115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 132, 133, 134, 137, 138, 
139 and 151, Plat A, Salt Lake City Survey, being 
a survey of part of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and particularly all of 
the right, title and interest of said grantors in 
and to said artesian, percolating and natural 
sub-surface waters appurtenant to, belong to, 
underlying and contained in the following des-
cribed property in said city, county,_ and state, 
to-wit: 
"Commencing 14 rods South from the north-
east corner of Lot 8: Block 138; Plat A, Salt 
Lake City Survey, and running thence West 19 
Rods, thence South 6 rods, thence East 9 rods, 
thence North 3lf2 rods, thence east 10 rods, thence 
north 2% rods to the place of beginning, together 
with a right of way along the South line of the 
East 10 rods thereof, Eastward to Second West 
Street. 
''For said foregoing considerations grantees 
may drain said described lands of sub-surface 
and percolating water so far as can he done from 
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underground, but without going on said premises 
to dig or make drains or otherwise interfere 
therewith.'' 
The clear intent and legal effect of this document is 
apparent. It simply grants to the Utah Oil Refining 
Comp:any underground water rights which lie beneath 
certain :property particularly described by met~s and 
bounds, which description at its conclusion mentions a 
right of way along the south line of the property. This 
right-of-way along the south line is simply part of the 
area described from which the water rights, lying under-
neath the property, are to be taken, and there is nothing 
in this grant to show that it conveyed any interest in 
realty as such, merely water rights. It is not a grant 
of a right-of-way, but of water rights lying underneath 
the described property. The mention of right-of-way 
is an integral part of the paragraph describing the 
property. Not only this, but the later varagraph specif-
ically denies the grantee the right to go upon said 
premises or "interfere therewith". This is scarcely con-
sistent with a right-.iof-way to go upon the premises. 
Even if this language could be construed as a grant, 
and is it submitted that it cannot be, the only conceiv-
able purpose of such a grant would be to go upon the 
land for uses in connection with the use of underground 
waters, not a general easement as appellant seeks to 
establish. American Jurisprudence makes this clear. 
Thus at 17 Am. Jur. 99·6, sec. 98: 
''The use of an easement must be confined 
strictly to the purposes for which it vvas granted 
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or reserved. 1-\. principle which underlies the use 
of all easements is that the owner of an ease-
ment cannot materially increase the burden of 
it upon the servient estate or impose thereon a 
ne'v and additional burden .... " 
Moreover, there is abandonment of any easement 
that might conceivably have existed. Ruling ~Case Law 
states the well established rule, at 9 R. C. L. 812, sec. 
68 as follows : 
''An easement may be abandoned by unequiv-
ocal acts showing a clear intention to abandon 
and terminate the right, or it may be done by 
acts in pais without deed or other writing. The 
intention to abandon is the material question, 
and it may be proved by an infinite variety of 
acts. It is a question of fact to be ascertained 
from all the circumstances of the case; and, as 
a rule, no one case can be authority for another. 
Time is not a necessary element; it is not the 
duration of the nonuser, but the nature of the 
acts done by the dominant owner, or of the ad-
verse acts acquiesced in by him, and the inten-
tion which the one or the other indicates, that 
are important, and a. cessation of use for a term 
less than the :prescriptive period, accompanied 
by acts clearly indicating an intent to abandon 




Mr. Clark of the Oil Refining Company testified 
that there was never any user made by that company 
from the time of the grant to time of executing the in-
strument of conveyance to the appellant in O·ctober, 
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1946, and 'to time of trial. His testimony clearly showed 
that the Oil C·ompany had neither need nor use for any 
right-of-way and never at any time asserted itself the 
possessor of such a right. The testimony of the other 
witnesses showed that the right of way was blocked 
at the west end during the 1930's by a specie of fence 
and rubbish, and in 1942 the present respondents re-
placed the block of the right-of-way, which continued 
to the time of trial. 
There is an additional factor. It is evidenced by the 
record (Exhibit S) that respondents and predecessors 
in interest have paid taxes on the property in question, 
have protected it by a substantial enclosure, have culti-
vated and improved it, have expended labor and money 
upon it, and have adversely held it against all other 
persons, including the Utah Oil Company, for the stat-
utory time of adverse possession. See Section 104-2-7 
U.C.A. 1943. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
The allegations of the third cause of action are 
identical with those of the second cause of action, except 
that the right-of-way is described as being 10 feet wide, 
more or less, rather than 10 feet wide. The argument 
herein, relative to the second cause of action, is therefore 
adopted for the third cause of action. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
A. There is a failure of proof to ~establish an ~ease­
ment of any kind in behalf of appellant over the property 
of respondents by prescription. 
Apparently the theory of the fourth cause of action 
is that the appellants have acquired a right-of-way over 
respondents' property by virtue of prescription and 
adverse user over a :period of more than twenty years. 
The recent case of · Bertolina vs. Fr.ates, 89 Utah 
238, 57 P. 2d 346, clearly sets forth the rules of law 
applicable to acquisition of an easement by prescription. 
Thus at page 348, the court states: 
''Where a person claims to have acquired an 
easement by prescription over another's land, 
he must show that he has acquired it by his own 
continuous, open, uninterrupted, and adverse 
user under claim of right for the twenty-year 
prescriptive period. The prescriptive right is 
based originally upon the theory of a grant im-
plied from long user. Funk v. Anderson, 22 Utah, 
238, 61 P. 1006. It runs to the individual and not 
to the public. Mr. Washburn, in his, work on 
Easements (4th Ed.), sec 43, p. 164, says : 'But 
one can not claim a right of way as a :private one 
by showing that it had been used by the pro-
prietors of other lots than his own, He must 
show a user by himself or his predecessors of 
the way to his own lot under a claim of right 
for the requisite period of time, continuously, by 
the acquiescence of the owner of the land over 
which it lies.' 
''Everywhere in the books the statement upon 
the creation of a prescriptive right is: That it 
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must be adverse, not by license or favor, under 
claim or assertion of right, hostile to the right of 
the owner so as to expose the claimant to an action 
of trespass if his claim is not well founded. A 
user by an individual which is not distinguished 
from that of the public will be considered per-
missive and not adverse unless there is evidence 
that it was under a claim of right in himself and 
that the owner knowing of such claim acquiesced 
in it. Authorities should be unnecessary to dem-
onstrate that principle. The mere statement of 
the conditions under which the prescriptive right 
may be acquired negatives the idea of user by 
others either adding to or detracting from the 
rights of a particular claimant.'' 
The court continues at page 349, relative to unity of 
ownership: 
"Unity of possession and ownership prevents 
the acquisition of a prescriptive right. As the 
book say : A man cannot prescribe against him-
self." 
And at page 350 : 
"It thus appears from the evidence that there 
was a unity of title and possession of the tracts 
owned by plaintiffs and these defendants down 
to the year 1896 and again from 1910 .to 1919. 
There is no period in the history of the title to 
these tracts when the prescriptive right could 
have been acquired. Unity of possession and 
ownership, as heretofore indicated, defeats the 
running of the prescriptive period. 
'' 'An owner of land can not have an ease-
ment in his own estate in fee, for the plain and 
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obvious reason that in having the jus disponendi 
- the full and unlimited right and power to 
make any and every possible use of the land -
all subordinate and inferior derivative rights 
are neeessarily merged and lost in the higher 
right * * *: Accordingly "\Yhen the owner of an 
estate enjoys an easement over another estate 
and acquires title to the latter the easement is 
thereby extinguished.' 19 C. J. 945, sec. 156. '' 
In the case before the court, the record clearly dis-
closes that the west portion of the land which appellant 
contends is the dominant tenement and which lies in 
Lot 7, and the east portion of the land over which the 
easement is claimed, which lies in Lot 8 and now belongs 
to Respondents, were joined as one piece as late as 1929. 
Exhibit S, ·w .. hich is an abstract covering both the prop-
erties in Lot 7 and Lot 8, clearly shows that until 1929, 
Cyrus Neal owned all of this property. He acquired the 
southerly portion of the entire tract on March 2, 1910, 
see entry 16 of said exhibit, and the northerly portion 
on April 21, 1916, see entry 23. He owned all of this 
property until July 8, 1929, when he conveyed the west-
erly 1lortion lying in Lot 7 to one Byron D. Nebeker, see 
entry 32. No prescriptive period could possibly com-
mence to run, therefore, until the year 1929, and there 
could obviously not be twenty years adverse· user by the 
year 1946. On this ground alone there is complete 
failure of proof. 
There is an even more complete failure of proof to 
show continuous and adverse user by appellant or its 
predecessors in interest. The statement of facts has set 
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forth in detail the testimony of a great number of 
witnesses to the effect that during the period of the 
1930's the west end of the alleged right-of-way was so 
choked with debris, wagon wheels and remnants of an 
old fence that it was impossible to drive any sort of 
vehicle through the area. While there was some testi-
mony that vehicles of appellant had driven through the 
area in 1937 and a few later years, the driving was spor-
adic a.nd seasonal. In this connection, it is pointed out 
that the conflict which appears for a few of these years 
in the testimony was resolved by the action of the trial 
judge in his findings and judgment in favor of respon-
dents. He had an opportunity to observe the witnesses 
on the stand, their demeanor and apparent credibility, 
and there is certainly a tremendous amount of testi-
mony clearly showing the blockage during this period. 
Actually, there is no proper testimony at all in the record 
showing any continuous adverse user as a right-of-way 
for vehicles for twenty years, and the attempt to prove 
this produced, particularly before 1936, proof of the 
passage of children getting groceries or of Otto Grow 
occasionally walking a part of the way along the south 
part of the lot to go to work. Moreover, it is clear from 
the record that whatever sporadic and uncertain passage 
there might have been was with the full consent of the 
predecessors in interest of res:pondents' property, until 
respondents closed the right-of-way by boarding it up 
in 1942. See R. 163. This is of particular interest in 
such conflict as developed after the year 1937. See, for 
example, R. 158. It is submitted that there is a complete 
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lack of testimony to establish a prescriptive easement 
under the applicable rules of law, particularly as set 
forth in Bertinola rs. Frates, supra. See Lund vs. Wilcox, 
34 Utah 205, 97 Pac. 33; Farr vs. Wheelw,rig'ht 'Con-
struction Co., 49 Utah 274, 163 Pac. 256. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
A. There is no evidence to support a restraining 
order against respondents or to form the basis for damages 
to personal property. 
The fifth cause of action seeks an order restaining 
the respondents from placing debris or material in the 
ditch or depression which lies along the north side of 
appellant's warehouse No. 1 which is located on property 
to the south of that belonging to respondents, or from 
interfering with appellant's access thereto for purposes 
of cleaning the same. Punitive and actual damages are 
also sought by reason of alleged flooding of the ware-
house because the ditch was allowed to become clogged 
with debris. 
At the outset, it is clear that this so-called ditch lay 
wholly upon the land of the appellant, next adjacent to 
respondents' south property line. Thus at page 219 of 
the record, Otto Grow testified as to the location of the 
ditch, and it is not contradicted: 
"Q. And you say this ditch was contained en .. 
tirely within your own property~ 
A. Yes, that is the way we figured when we 
surveyed to remodel this building on the north 
side. Your survey shows that was on our prop-
erty. 
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Q. This .property, then, would be on that 
stretch three inches wide on the east and about 
eight or nine inches on the west~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is where the ditch runs~ 
A. Yes.'' 
The right to clean the ditch is clear, provided appel-
lant did not trespass upon the property of the respon-
dents to do so. If it had such a right to come upon this 
prorperty to clean the ditch, it could only arise in the 
nature of an easement, through twenty years prescriptive 
usage. The evidence in the record in this regard seems to 
be in the testimony of Edward J. Burke, R. 99, 100, that 
two to four years prior to the time of trial Delsa Crystal 
told him to leave the premises of respondents when he 
was cleaning out the ditch, and again in the testimony of 
Otto Grow, R. 172, that he had overheard Delsa Crystal 
tell Burke to get off the property, about a year 1prior to 
the trial. Whether these incidents are one and the same 
is not entirely clear. There is clearly a lack of evidence 
to show twenty years user within the meaning of the rules 
of law applicable to prescription. 
So far as the claim that res:pondents had placed, 
themselves, debris in the ditch is concerned, there is not 
a scintilla of evidence in the record to support any such 
claim, and appellant has pointed to none. Appellant in 
its argument at page 13 of its brief on the fifth cause 
of action also states that respondents admit removing 
gravel supporting the side of the ditch, and directs the 
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court's attention to ~page 61 of the record. R. 61 contains 
at the top of the ~page the findings of the trial court in 
respect to the sixth cause of action, which reads as 
follows: ''and that defendants removed during the year 
1942 from the westerly one-third of said right-of-way 
cinders and loose sand''. 
There is no proof that any ·damage to mer-
chandise in the warehouse by flooding was caused 
by any act of the respondents. The statement of 
facts shows clearly that there was serious doubt as to 
whether or not the ditch was anything much more than 
a shallow depression, that the damage was done during 
the course of a violent r-ain storm which piled a great 
depth of water in the area and deposited four to five 
inches of silt on the lawns, and that whether the ditch 
or depression was clear or obstructed would have had 
no bearing on its ability to handle the volume of water 
of the storm or flood at the time the damage was done, 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
A. There is no proof of any damage to appellant by 
virtue of removal of gravel from alleged right-of-way. 
In the sixth cause of action appellant seeks both 
punitive and actual damages for the removal of gravel 
from the westerly :portion of the alleged right-of-way 
area. For reasons which have heretofore been argued at 
length, it is submitted that appellant had no right, title 
or interest in or to any part of respondents' land, by 
easement or otherwise. The fa.ct that the respondent 
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Marion Crystal removed a yard or yard and one-half 
of rna terial, which he testified was cinders and loose 
sand from this area to another part of the yard for level-
ing and landscaping work clearly gives no cause of action 
for damages. It is also noted that any such cause of 
action could in .any event only have arisen in favor of 
Otto Grow, the individual who claimed he caused the 
gravel to be placed on the area in 1937. He is not a party 
to the action. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the judgment of 
the lower court should be fully sustained, since entirely 
consistent with the evidence and the rules of applicable 
law, and that respondents should he awarded costs on 
this a prpeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Skeen, Thurman and Worsley, 
and Edward G. Linsley, 
Attorneys for R.espondents 
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